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ECO N O M IC EVO LU TIO N : D IA L E C T IC A L AN D
D A R W IN IA N
HE contribution of Thorstein Veblen to economic thought
bears a striking resemblance to the body of doctrine elabo
rated by Karl Marx. This resemblance can be seen, for
example, in the correspondence between their theories or ex
planations of economic change and development. The one, his
torical materialism, was developed by Marx on the basis of the
Hegelian dialectic, while the other, institutional mutationism, was
originated by Veblen from the Darwinian principles of variation,
selection, and survival. Although the postulates underlying the
two theories differ and operate through diverse mechanics of
change, they perform similar functions in the two. systems and
lead to corresponding social philosophies. Their first and perhaps
more important function consists in furnishing the criteria for
judging the phenomenon of capitalism as a system of productive
efficiency and, at the same time, for evaluating that body of
knowledge in which capitalism finds theoretical justification.
Since it is in terms of these postulates that the merits of capital
ism and the ends it serves are weighed, both historical materialism
and institutional mutationism are actually involved with a larger
and decidedly philosophical problem, that of the theory of value
from the standpoint of social morality.1 A discussion of the con-

T

1
This is readily recognized in the case of Marx. While not so obvious it is equally
true of Veblen. Neither Marx nor Veblen could avoid making value-judgments and
at the same time attempt a critique of capitalist economy. It is well to recall in this
connection Veblen’s words: “ Whatever is, is clearly at one and the same time, both
right and wrong.” {Journal of Political Economy, V III, No. i [December, 1899],
n o .) Besides, historical materialism and institutional mutationism are theories of
progress. Progress in the sociological sense is not simply a matter of biological
change, or what Veblen, hiding behind a fictitious apathy of scientific detachment,
would call non-purposive change in accordance with “ opaque cause and effect.”
Progress is change for the better; “ an increase, in the course of time, of the value of
life, whatever that may be.” (R. B. Perry, Moral Economy [New York, 1909],
p. 126.) When, therefore Veblen bases progress or change upon economic arrange
ments and then makes the “ survival” of these arrangements depend upon their
“ fitness” for the purposes of life he is doing nothing less than formulating the basis
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siderations that grow out of this function transcends the scope of
the present paper which will be confined to a discussion of those
that grow out of the second function. This function performed by
these respective postulates is that of constituting the causal norms
which are conceived as the standards in terms of which economic
institutions evolve and shape the course and character of the rest
of cultural development.
I
TECHNOLOGY, CLASS STRUGGLE, AND OCCUPATIONAL
DISCIPLINE

A t the outset it should be stated that neither the Marxian nor
the Veblenian interpretation is accepted here as a technological
explanation of culture, if by technology is meant the mechanical
arts. Even if technology is defined more broadly so as to mean the
“ organization of productive forces,” as might be done in the case
of Veblen, the Marxian materialistic conception cannot be called a
technological explanation without seriously distorting its essen
tially dialectical and class-struggle character. Y e t this technolog
ical explanation has found acceptance among a number of econo
mists whose judgment can hardly be overlooked. In Europe it has
been championed by Professor Werner Sombart,*2 and in this
country by Professor Alvin Hansen.3 It is undeniable that numer
of a value-judgment. Moreover, when he makes mechanical efficiency the test of
survival, it is clear that he means efficiency as measured by hutnan welfare, or to use
his own words, “ facility of life.” (See Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class [New
York, 1931], pp. 194-95.) The “ facility of life” afforded by an economic organiza
tion turns upon abundance or scarcity of goods which involves the question of wants
which again involves the problem of ethical or economic evaluation.
2 See Mandell M. Bober, Karl Marx’s Economic Interpretation of History (Cam
bridge, 1927), chaps, i and ii. Also, Sidney Hook’s recently published, Towards the
Understanding of Karl Marx (New York, 1933) chap. xii. The present essay was
written and submitted for publication before the author had read Dr. Hook’s analy
sis.

3 See Alvin H. Hansen, “ The Technological Interpretation of History,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, X X X V I, 72 ff. In a recent and larger work Professor Hansen
places as much emphasis upon “ class” factors as he does upon technology. “ No one
doubts,” he states, “ that the rise in the standard of living of all European peoples in
the last hundred years was the result fundamentally of the Industrial Revolution,
of the advance of science and the development of improved techniques. Y et this
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ous passages from Marx, cited for example by Professor Hansen
do lend credence to the technological argument. But any doubt
about M arx’s attempt to explain history by anything but class
struggle as determined by the property relations governing in
come and production ought to be dispelled by his famous words in
the opening paragraph of the Communist Manifesto.
T h e history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.
Freem an and slave, patrician and plebian, lord and serf, guild-m aster and
journeym an, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant op
position to one another, carried on uninterrupted, now hidden, now open
fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of
society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.4

This struggle as it manifests itself in modern society is not de
termined by the character of tools, but by the capitalistic employ
ment of them.5 The control of the means of production is not an
end in itself but rather the means of controlling the social surplus.6
The surplus, of course, is large or small in proportion to techno
logical development.7 While Marx looked upon tools, and likerevolutionary change in the method of production necessitated a remodeling of social
institutions..........Part of our difficulties are caused by the lag in institutional ad
justments. These adjustments come partly (perhaps chiefly) out of changes in the
balance of power between groups or classes (as Marx had it), and partly out of the
application of science to the field of social institutions.” Hansen, Economic Stabiliza
tion in an Unbalanced World (New York, 1932), p. 360.
4
“ The Communist Manifesto” in The Essentials of Marx (edited by Algernon
Lee [New York, 1926], p. 31). All other citations are from this edition of the Mani
festo.
s “ Since therefore machinery, considered alone, shortens the hours of labor, but,
when in the service of capital, lengthens them . . . . since in itself it is a victory of
man over the forces of nature, but in the hands of capital, makes man the slave of
those forces; since in itself it increases the wealth of the producers, but in the hands
of capital, makes them paupers— for all these reasons and others besides, says the
bourgeois economist without more ado, it is clear as noon day that all these contra
dictions are a mere semblance of the reality, and that, as a matter of fact, they have
neither an actual nor a theoretical existence. Thus he saves himself from all further
puzzling of the brain, and what is more, implicitly declares his opponent to be stupid
enough to contend against, not the capitalistic employment of machinery, but
machinery itself.” Marx, Capital (Kerr edition, Chicago, 1906), I, 482.
6 That the class struggle ultimately centers around the control of the social sur
plus seems to be substantiated by Marx’s untranslated Theorien uber den Mehrwert
(edited by Karl Kautsky, Stuttgart, 1905).
7 “ The productiveness of labour depends not only on the proficiency of the work
man, but on the perfection of his tools.” Marx, Capital, I, 374. Also see p. 200, esp.
n. 2.
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wise the natural environment, as the indispensable basis of the
labor process, he takes the latter as the physical basis of that
process and the former as a limiting condition. He states that
“ the elementary factors of the labor-process are (i), the personal
activity of man, i.e., work itself, (2), the subject of that work, and
(3), its instruments...........As the earth is his [man's] original lard
er, so too it is his original tool house...........The earth itself is an
instrument of labor, but when used as such in agriculture implies
a whole series of other instruments and a comparatively high de
velopment of labor."8 The manner in which the labor process
is limited by technology and physical environment Marx describes
as follows:
I t is not the tropics w ith their luxuriant vegetation, but the tem perate
zone, that is the m other country of capital. It is not the mere fertility of the
soil, but the differentiation of the soil, the va rie ty of its natural products,
the changes of the seasons, which form the physical basis for the social d ivi
sion of labour, and which, b y changes in the natural surroundings, spur man on
to the m ultiplication of his wants, his capabilities, his means and modes of
labou r...........Favorable natural conditions alone, gave us only the possi
bility, never the reality, of surplus-labour, nor, consequently, of surplus-value
and a surplus-product. T h e result of difference in the natural conditions of
labour is this, that the same q uan tity of labour satisfies, in different countries,
a different mass of requirements, consequently, that under circum stances in
other respects analogous, the necessary labour-time is different. T hese con
ditions affect surplus-labour only as natural limits, i.e., b y fixing the points at
which labour for others can begin .9

The labor process, then, whatever its technological means or its
physical limitations, is always the attempt of man to wring satis
factions from nature. It is not technology or physical environ
ment but the “ social conditions" under which the labor process is
conducted that reveal the nature of society.
T h e labour process, resolved as above into its simple elem entary factors,
is human action w ith a view to the production of use values, appropriation
of natural substances to human requirem ents; it is the necessary condition
for effecting exchange of m atter between man and N atu re; it is the everlast
ing nature-imposed condition of human existence, and therefore is independ
ent of every social phase of that existence, or rather, is common to every
such phase...........A s the taste of the porridge does not tell you who grew the
8Marx, Capital, I, 198-99.

9 Ibid., I , 56 3 -6 5 *
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oats, no more does this simple process tell you of itself w hat are the social
conditions under which it is taking place, w hether under the slave-ow ner’s
bru tal lash, or the anxious eye of the capitalist, w hether Cincinnatus carries
it on in tilling his modest farm or a savage in killing wild animals w ith stones.10

While techpological means indicate the “ degree of development
to which human labor has attained” and “ the social conditions
under which that labor is carried on/’11 they do not determine
these social conditions.12 The latter are determined by the modes
of production, distribution, and exchange. But “ modes” of pro
duction should not be confused with “ means” of production. It is
from such a confusion that the technological argument arises.
M arx’s description of the “ labor process” serves him as the basis
for his theories of surplus value and exploitation. In this descrip
tion he develops the thesis that both capital goods and consumers’
goods originate in the “ labor process.” 13 Tools are therefore noth
ing but stored up labor.14 It is only under certain conditions that
these tools become capital.
10Ibid., pp. 204-5.
11 Ibid., p. 200. Also note Marx’s statement that “ Technology discloses man’s
mode of dealing with nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life,
and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the
mental conceptions that flow from them.” Ibid., p. 406, n. 2.
12 “ Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange, and
of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of
exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the
nether world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade past, the his
tory of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive
forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that
are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule.” Marx, the
Communist Manifesto, p. 36.
13 “ Since past labour always disguises itself as capital, i.e., since the passive of the
labour of A, B, C, etc., takes the form of the active of the non-labourer X , bourgeois
and political economists are full of praises of the services of dead and gone labour,
which, according to the Scotch genius M ’Culloch, ought to receive a special re
muneration in the shape of interest, profit, etc. The powerful and ever-increasing
assistance given by past labour to the living labour process under the form of means
of production, is therefore, attributed to that form of past labour in which it is
alienated, as unpaid labour, from the worker himself, i.e., to its capitalistic form.”
Marx, Capital, I, 666-67.
14 “ We know that the means of production and subsistence, while they remain
the property of the immediate producer, are not capital. They become capital, only
under circumstances in which they serve at the same time as means of exploitation
and subjection of the labourer.” Ibid., p. 840.
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T h e conditions which generally govern production m ust be differentiated
in order that the essential points of difference be not lost sight of in view of
the general uniform ity which is due to the fact that the subject, mankind, and
the object, nature, remain the same. T h e failure to remember this one fact is
the source of all the wisdom of modern economists who are tryin g to prove
the eternal nature and harm ony of existing social conditions. T h u s they
say, e.g., that no production is possible without some instrument of production,
let that instrument be only the hand; that none is possible without past ac
cumulated labor, even i f that labor consist of mere skill which has been accumu
lated and concentrated in the hand of the savage b y repeated exercise. C ap ital
is, among other things, also an instrum ent of production, also past im per
sonal labor. Hence, capital is a universal, eternal natural phenomenon;
which is true if we disregard the specific properties which turn an “ instru
ment of production” and “ stored up labor” into capital.1*

The conditions which turn an “ instrument of production” into
capital arise from the institutions of property and competitive ex
change. Under these conditions “ capital is not a thing” but “ a so
cial relation between persons, established by the instrumentality
of things.” 16 Only as capital do the means of production become
the condition whereby human labor is exploited and its products
appropriated.17 Against this subordination and exploitation hu
man labor persistently revolts. The revolt is ostensibly a struggle
between classes for the control of the means of production and
subsistence. In its more fundamental sense it is a struggle for the
control of the social surplus which, as will be noted later, begets
social power and political authority.
js Marx, Critique of Political Economy (Kerr edition, Chicago, 1904), pp. 269-70.
(Italics mine.)
16 Capital, I, 839. Elsewhere Marx states: “ Now capital also is a social relation
of production. It is a bourgeois relation of production, a condition of production of
a bourgeois society. Are not the means of subsistence, the implements of labor, and
the raw material, of which capital consists, the results of definite social relations;
were they not produced and stored up under certain social conditions? Will they
not be used for further production under certain social conditions within definite
social relations? And is it not just this definite social character that transforms into
capital that product which serves for further production?” “ Wage Labor and
Capital,” in Lee, op. cit., p. 94.
*7 “ The contest between the capitalist and the wage-labourer dates back to the
very origin of capital. It raged on throughout the whole manufacturing period. But
only since the introduction of machinery has the workman fought against the instru
ment of labor itself, the material embodiment of capital. He revolts against this par
ticular form of the means of production, as being the material basis of the capitalist
mode of production.” Marx, Capital, I, 466-67. (Italics mine.)
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In our later discussion of the postulates of Marxian evolution,
it will be shown that this struggle for the control of the social sur
plus has two meanings. One is the absolute or real and the other
the relative or phenomenal. From the absolute standpoint the
class struggle symbolizes the effort of human labor to emancipate
itself from subordination to its products; it is the attempt of labor
to realize a socio-ethical position consonant with its productive
function.18 In the absolute sense there are no separate and dis
tinct class struggles. There is only a succession of revolts which
we distinguish as peculiar to a given epoch but which in actuality
constitute one indivisible historical phenomenon. From the sec
ond or relative standpoint, class struggles differ in particular peri
ods because the method of appropriating the social surplus differs
in different periods. In consequence, the specific character of so
ciety and the state in a given period of history differs, being de
termined by the peculiar way in which the social surplus of that
period is appropriated.
T h e specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus labor is pum ped out
of the direct producers, determines the relation of rulers and ruled, as it grows
im m ediately out of production itself and re-acts upon it as a determ ining
element. Upon this is founded the entire form ation of the economic com
m unity which grows up out of the conditions of production itself, and this
also determines its specific political shape. It is alw ays the direct relation of
the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers, which
reveals the innermost secret, the hidden foundation of the entire social con
struction, and w ith it of the political form of the relations betw een sover
eignty and dependence, in short, of the corresponding form of the state.
T h e form of this relation betw een rulers and ruled n aturally corresponds
alw ays w ith a definite stage in the developm ent of the m ethods of labor and
of its productive social power. T h is does not prevent the same economic
18
Professor Perlman has given a similar interpretation of the class struggle in his
analysis of the labor movement. He states: “ While the concept of labor as a ‘mass’ in
the grip of a ‘force’ is the common basis of all intellectualist theories of the labor
movement, intellectuals fall into three distinct groupings, depending on what they
take the nature of that ‘force’ to be. The Marxian, who is a ‘determinist-revolutionary,’ pictures it as the ever growing force of material production, embodied in
the tools of production and in technological methods. This ‘force,’ in seeking to
break through the capitalist strait jacket which encases it and impedes its further
growth, is inevitably hurling the labor ‘mass’ against the political and legal regime
established and defended by the capitalist class.” Selig Perlman, A Theory of the
Labor Movement (New York, 1928), p. 282.
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basis from showing infinite variations and gradations in its appearance,
even though its principal conditions are everywhere the same. T h is is due
to innumerable outside circum stances, natural environm ent, race peculiari
ties, outside historical influences, and so forth, all of which must be ascer
tained b y careful analysis.19

It might be argued that when technology is looked upon as em
bracing both the mechanical and the non-mechanical arts of a
given society no essential harm is done to the Marxian interpreta
tion by calling it technological. For when used in this sense it is
synonymous with “ mode of production.” Even so, it is not the
“ mode of production” which of itself produces conflict according
to Marx, but the consciousness aroused in social classes by their
opposing productive and distributive relations under the institu
tion of private property. Therefore the economic pressure, which
according to the Marxian materialistic conception determines the
character of the social order at any given time, thereby shaping
the course of history, is not the disciplinary effect of changing
techniques upon social habits, but rather the impact of income
upon the fortunes of social classes under changing conditions of
production.20 When this economic pressure is envisaged as tech
nological exigencies the nature of its impact must be shifted from
income to the discipline of workmanship or of industrial efficiency.
That such a rendition of M arx’s interpretation distorts the char
acter of its inner drives is readily seen from a cursory examination
of the revolutionary motives attributed by him to the modern
proletariat. Although it is permissible to reason that since Marx
held the proletariat (labor) to be the source of creative effort and,
therefore, of industrial efficiency, it would be wholly incorrect to
conclude that he saw this function as vocational activity which
19 Capital, III, 919.
20 “ Marx,” states Engels, “ was the first to discover the great law which governs
the march of history. According to this law, all historical struggles, although they
seem to take place on the political, religious, philosophical, or any other ideal plane,
are, in reality, nothing else than the more or less clear expression of struggles be
tween social classes. The existence of these classes and their collisions, are them
selves determined by the degree of development in the economic situation, by the
prevailing mode of production, and by the methods of exchange which result. This
law bears the same relationship to history as the law of the conservation of energy
bears towards the physical sciences.” Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
(Eden and Cedar Paul, tr.; New York, 1926), p. 22. Also see p. 7.
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in the form of occupational discipline determines the class animus
and the revolutionary motives of the proletariat. What he main
tained was that the revolutionary motives and will of the prole
tariat result from its growing consciousness of the increasing dis
parity between its importance as the source of productive efficien
cy and the value of its economic and social rewards. Industrial
efficiency never comes in as a major force or as the criterion of in
stitutional utility in the Marxian system.
It is in Veblen’s scheme of economic evolution that industrial
efficiency plays the decisive role. Indeed one of Veblen’s chief
criticisms against Marxian materialism is that it assumes that
economic pressure takes the form of “ output” or income rather
than productive efficiency. Thus he contends that
T h e class struggle is conceived to be “ m aterial,” but the term “ m aterial”
is in this connection used in a m etaphorical sense. It does not mean m e
chanical or physical, or even physiological, but economic. I t is m aterial in
the sense that it is a struggle betw een classes for the m aterial means of life.
. . . . T h e dialectic of the m ovem ent of social progress, therefore, m oves on
the spiritual plane of human desire and passion, not on the (literally) m a
terial plane of m echanical and physiological stress, on which the develop
m ental process of brute creation unfolds itself. It is a sublim ated m aterial
ism, sublim ated b y the dom inating presence of the conscious human sp irit;
but it is conditioned b y the m aterial facts of the production of the means of
life.21

In a previous essay,22 it was stated that while Veblen accepted
a materialistic explanation of history he denied that materialistic
factors exert their effect through the dialectics of class struggle.
But in the quotation given in the preceding paragraph it will be
noticed that Veblen places “ mechanical” and “ physiological” in
opposition to “ economic.” The logical inference of this implicit
distinction is that if he accepted a materialistic interpretation of
history23 his material factors are evidently of a different order
21 Veblen, The Place of Science in Modern Civilization (New York, 1930), p. 415.
22 Abram L. Harris, “ Types of Institutionalism,” Journal of Political Economy,
December, 1932, pp. 721 ff.
23 Speaking of the conditions making for change in the United States, Veblen
states: “ As is always the case, in the nature of things, so in this case, too, the changes
that have taken effect in the material circumstances are the creative factors which
have gone into action, as a driving force and a controlling agency, and have set afoot
a new line of habituation.” Absentee Ownership (New York, 1923), p. 206.
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from those of Marx. There are, indeed, two respects in which Veblen’s material factors differ from those of Marx: first, in the way
they exert their influence upon the course of human affairs; and,
secondly, in their qualitative characteristics. An examination of
the institutional conflict that Veblen finds peculiar to Western
civilization will assist in distinguishing his material factors in
these respects. According to Veblen:
. . . . Secular life among the peoples of Christendom is governed in re
cent times b y three several system s of use and wont, sovereign action-pat
terns induced b y the run of past habituation:— the m echanical system of
industry; the price-system ;24 and the national establishm ent. T h e existing
industrial system is dom inated b y the technology of physics and chem istry,
and is a product of recent times, a profoundly modified derivative of the
handicraft industry. T h e current price-system is dom inated b y absentee
ownership and is also a greatly altered outgrowth of the handicraft industry
and its p etty trade; its continued growth in recent times has, in effect,
changed it into a credit-price system . T h e nation, considered as a habit of
thought, is a residual form of the predatory dynastic State of early modern
times, superficially altered b y a suffusion of dem ocratic and parliam entary
institutions in recent tim es.25

The oldest of these institutions is the state, but running closely
behind it is business enterprise. The mechanical system of indus
try is the newest institution. While both the state and business
enterprise rest upon industry for material support, the latter,
from the standpoint of the norms of conduct and knowledge en
forced by its discipline, is most alien to the other two.26 On the
other hand, the points of coincidence between the state and busi
ness are very close. Although not identical in aim these two insti
tutions have come to fortify each other.
T h e state, that is to say, the governm ent, was once an organization for
the control of affairs in the interest of princely or dynastic ends. In internal
affairs statecraft was occupied w ith questions of the dynastic succession,
the endeavors and intrigues of the political magnates, fiscal adm inistration
directed to finding adequate support for the princely power, and the like.
In external politics the o bjective end was dynastic prestige and security,
m ilitary success, and the like. Such is still in part the end of political en-

24 Price system is used by Veblen as a correlative of business enterprise.
25 Absentee Ownership, p. 398.
36 The Theory of Business Enterprise (New York, 1904), p. 67, and pp. 302-3.
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deavor in those countries, as e.g., G erm any,2? A ustria, or Ita ly , where the
transition to a constitutional governm ent has not been com pleted. B u t
since the advent of constitutional governm ent and parliam entary represen
tation, business ends have taken the lead of dynastic ends in statecraft, very
much in the same measure as the transition to constitutional m ethods has
been effectually carried through. A constitutional governm ent is a business
governm ent.28

The relation which Veblen thus posits between the modern
state and business enterprise originated, in point of evolution, in
the transition from feudalism and petty trade to modern com
merce and industry, or to use familiar Marxian terminology,
originated in the period that gave birth to the bourgeoisie. When
Veblen argues this relationship between business ownership and
the modern state from the vantage of psychology, he attempts to
show that the genesis of it antedates the economic changes of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Since both the state and
business enterprise are invidious institutions, their interrelation
is rooted in the predatory dispositions of human nature whilst the
non-invidious industrial system is the psychological expression of
non-predatory traits of workmanship. In thus viewing this mod
ern institutional conflict, psycho-genetically, he sees it as an ageold conflict between “ exploit” and “ industry,” a conflict that
reaches back into those “ savage” and “ barbarian” cultures out of
which Western civilization sprang.29 What Veblen seems to be
saying is that not only modern culture but history itself is the re
flection of a conflict between the habits of industry and exploita
tion arising out of man’s struggle for existence in society. The eco
nomic circumstances by which this conflict is crystallized are the
prevailing technological scheme and the institution of private
property. These circumstances lead to conflict not through a con
sciousness of income differences between social classes but through
the discipline they exercise over the habits of vocational classes.
In other words, income and production under the governance of
property relations are not the economic considerations by which
27 Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (New York, 1918),
chaps, iii, v, and vii.
28 The Theory of Business Enterprise, p. 284. Also Absentee Ownership, p. 442.
29 The Theory of the Leisure Class, pp. 12-13.
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conflict is determined. Class interest and class division are deter
mined by the discipline of the pecuniary and the industrial occu
pations. These divergent types of occupations exercise different
disciplines, thereby enforcing different habits and, as a conse
quence, different outlooks and standards of judgment upon the
mentality of the different classes who are habitually employed in
them in making a living. Class antagonism is thus engendered by
conflicting habits that arise from the discipline of ownership, on
the one hand, and from that of workmanship, on the other, rather
than by the impact of differential conditions of income and pro
duction upon class fortunes. How the technological scheme and
private property enforce different disciplines upon occupational
classes and how they lead to a conflict in social habits will be seen
from a necessarily abridged account of Veblen’s theories of private
property and productive efficiency.
In the struggle for existence the “ material exigencies” encount
ered by man in his physical environment are “ systematized” into
“ the state of the industrial arts.” 30 The state of the industrial arts
arises out of man’s “ habitual material (industrial) occupations.”
It comprises those “ technological expedients” employed by man to
wring satisfactions from nature. These expedients are material
and immaterial in character. In their material aspect they include
“ tools, vessels, vehicles, raw materials, buildings, ditches, and
. . . . the land in use,” but likewise “ the useful minerals, plants
and animals.” 31 In their immaterial aspect they comprise a “ com
mon stock of information and proficiency in the ways and means
of life” which “ vests in the group at large.” 32 These “ technologi
cal expedients” that make up the state of the industrial arts there
fore embody the industrial efficiency of a given community or cul
ture. On the lower levels of culture the material contrivances
necessary for gaining a living are slight and are usually in the
workman’s possession.33 Here the free workman is the center or
3° The Place of Science, p. 44.
*xIbid., p. 329.

32Ibid., pp. 325-26.
33 “ As determined by the state of the industrial arts in such a culture, the mem
bers of the community co-operate in much of their work, to the common gain and to
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the controlling agent in economic relations; and man’s powers and
functions in the industrial community are decided on grounds of
workmanlike aptitude and special training.*34 This state of “ free
workmanship” is superseded by a pecuniary control of industry as
soon as private property develops. Since individual ownership is
a “ habit of thought” respecting “ surplus” wealth and the mate
rial means for obtaining it, private property does not appear until
adopted by some strategic class which subtly enforces it upon the
community.35 On the lower levels of culture individual ownership
first emerges from the “ parasitism” of magicians and priests.36 A
further strengthening of the habit of ownership takes place with
the “ advent of warfare” and “ the war chief.” Into the war chief’s
hands “ authority and pecuniary emoluments gather somewhat in
proportion as warlike exploits and ideals become habitual in the
community. More or less of loot falls into the hands of the victors
in any raid. The loot may be goods, cattle if any, or men, women,
and children; any or all of which may become (private) property
and be accumulated in sufficient mass to make a difference be
tween rich and poor.” 37 The appearance of the war lord also
marks a transition of property rights from a spiritual (priestly) to
a temporal (kingly) basis thus paving the way for the dynastic
state and its later derivative, the democratic state.38 The institu
no one’s detriment, since there is substantially no individual, or private, gain to be
sought. There is substantially no bartering or hiring, though there is a recognised
obligation in all members to lend a hand; and there is of course no price, as there is no
property and no ownership, for the sufficient reason that the habits of life under
these circumstances do not provoke such a habit of thought.” The Instinct of Work
manship (New York, 1922), p. 142.
34Ibid., p. 146.

36Ibid., pp. 155-56.

3s Ibid., p. 157.

37 Ibid., p. 157.

38“ In the last analysis the nation remains a predatory organism, in practical
effect an association of persons moved by a community interest in getting something
for nothing by force and fraud..........It is a residual derivative of the predatory
dynastic State, and as such it still continues to be, in the last resort, an establish
ment for the mobilisation of force and fraud as against the outside and for a penal
ized subservience of its underlying population at home.......... In recent times, owing
to the latterday state of the industrial arts, this national pursuit of warlike and
political ends has come to be a fairly single-minded chase after unearned income to be
procured by intimidation and intrigue.” Absentee Ownership, p. 442. Also The In 
stinct of Workmanship, p. 159.
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tion of ownership does not come into existence, however, until the
technological basis is ripe for it. This technological ripeness seems
to coincide with the growing resort to “ indirect methods of pro
duction” whereby it becomes advantageous for certain members
to “ engross” the community’s industrial efficiency, and in conse
quence, “ the usufruct of the industrial arts.”
H ereby the technological basis for a pecuniary control of industry is given,
in that the “ roundabout process of production” yields an income above the
subsistence of the workm en engaged in it, and the m aterial equipm ent of
appliances (crops, fruit-trees, live stock, m echanical contrivances) binds
this roundabout process of industry to a more or less determ inate place and
routine, such as to m ake surveillance and control possible. So far as the
workm an under the new phase of technology is dependent for his living on
the apparatus and the orderly sequence of the “ roundabout process” his
w ork m ay be controlled and the surplus yielded b y his industry m ay be
turned to account; it becom es worthwhile to own the m aterial means of in
dustry, and ownership of the m aterial means in such a situation carries w ith
it the usufruct of the com m unity’s im m aterial equipm ent of technological
proficiency.39

In this way the institution of property and the technological
scheme come to be the basic elements in the economic arrange
ment of a community’s life. In a simple technology where habits
of ownership have not begun to take root there are practically no
class distinctions, except those which might as a matter of course
follow differences in workmanship. But as soon as private property
is firmly implanted rather well-defined class distinctions begin to
crystallize.40 Veblen does not state that these class distinctions
originate in private property. The distinctions may have already
appeared but they do not have an economic basis until private
property is developed. A t any rate with the growth of property,
ownership and class differences become inextricably interwoven.
Thus the early manifestation of ownership serves further to dis
tinguish the underlying population from the rulers, the war lords,
the priests, and the magicians. As accumulated wealth increases
and falls into the hands of the latter they grow into a leisure class
exempt by virtue of ownership from tangible (industrial) per39 The Instinct of Workmanship, pp. 150-51.
4° A t least in those cultures genetically related to Western civilization. See ibid.,
pp. 157-60, and p. 202.
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formance, while the underlying population, the keepers of the
community’s industrial efficiency, perform the necessary produc
tive labor. This division of classes into the industrially exempt or
pecuniary, on the one hand, and the industrially employed or
mechanical on the other, is the source of the conflict in habits
which Veblen finds running its course from the earliest stages of
economic evolution on up in to modern times. The modern con
flict to which attention has already been drawn between the po
litical state and business enterprise41 on the one side and the
technicians on the other has been brought on by a cultural bifur
cation similar to that which occurred in primitive society. The
tenure of property in the modern community is based, however,
upon different conditions from those under which the early chief
tains and priests engrossed wealth, and the modern strategy of
ownership converges upon a different line of material items. The
difference in tenure is accounted for by changes in law and custom.
The difference in the strategy of ownership is held to be the result
of a technology based upon the application of science to the pro
duction of wealth.
B y classifying Veblen’s theory of evolution as technological, one
is likely to eliminate, or at all events, minimize the conflict in so
cial habits just described. Besides, the evidence is abundant that
Veblen does not understand technology to mean simply the me
chanical arts. For example, in one place he describes the “ primi
tive technology” as dominated by the “ non-mechanical arts of
plant and animal breeding” ;42 and, in another, he contrasts the
cultural effects of the “ primitive technology of tillage and cattlebreeding” 43 with those of the “ modern technology of the mechanic
arts.” 44 Although he constantly refers to mechanical implements
he looks upon them as indicative of a high or low degree of indus
trial efficiency.45 Thus technology, in the sense in which he uses it,
means the systematic adaptation of ways and means for accom41 This relationship Veblen argues at length. See Absentee Ownership, p. 430.
42 The Instinct of Workmanship, p. 90.
« Ibid., p. 100.
44Ibid., pp. 62-84 and p. 218. Also The Place of Science, pp. 43-55.
« The Instinct of Workmanship, p. 66.
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plishing the economic ends of group life, or, more simply, the
organization of industrial efficiency. The organization of indus
trial efficiency may or may not be mechanical in nature but it is
always material because industrial efficiency always deals with
the “ brute forces of nature.” It seems clear that Veblen uses
technology in a sense closely related to that in which Marx uses
“ modes of production.” As previously noted he maintains that
the institution of ownership is a “ habit of thought” respecting
“ the usufruct of the industrial arts.” The objective condition
which makes the expression of this “ habit of thought” possi
ble is the increase in technological efficiency. Moreover the par
ticular “ items of property to which the claims of ownership come
to attach will . . . . vary from time to time, according as the
state of the industrial arts will best afford an effectual exploi
tation of this usufruct through the tenure of one or another of
the material items requisite to the pursuit of industry.” 46 In other
words, what is owned depends upon what the technological
scheme will permit.47 Any given culture is, therefore, a creature of
its technology.
I t is assumed that in the growth of culture, as in its current m aintenance,
the facts of technological use and w ont are fundam ental and definitive, in
the sense that they underlie and condition the scope and m ethod of civilisa
tion in other than the technological respect, but not in such a sense as to pre
clude or overlook the degree in which these other conventions of any given
civilisation in their turn react on the state of the industrial arts.48

While the technological scheme creates the economic possibili
ties of ownership, the discipline which it exerts upon the industrial
classes who are habitually employed in it conflicts with that ex
erted by the institution of private property. This conflict in occu
pational habituation is just as essential to VeblenJs theory of evo
lution as class struggle is to M arx’s. The role which it plays in
Veblen’s theory of economic evolution is analogous to that which
class struggle plays in the Marxian interpretation. The two types
of conflict constitute the mechanism through which material or
economic circumstances transmit their influence. Because of its
46Ibid., p. 151.
48 The Instinct of Workmanship, p. vii.

47 The Place of Science, p. 333.

52

ABRAM L. HARRIS

dividuals who own the means of production. Since, however,
those who supply labor no more than those who own the means of
production have any exclusive claim to the “ engrossed” surplus,
the institution of property, instead of being the basis of a theory
of labor exploitation, leads to the idea of the misdirection of the
community’s industrial efficiency.54 Under these conditions it is
impossible to develop class struggle as a method by which labor,
conscious of its productive function, seeks to establish its corre
sponding distributive rights. Although in Veblen’s analysis the in
stitution of ownership places the pecuniary and technical classes
in distinctive consumption and production categories, the distri
bution of income comes in as a highly adventitious rather than as a
determining factor in shaping class antagonisms.
In spite of the great dissimilarity in the mechanism through
which economic factors exert themselves in the Marxian and
Veblenian explanations, there is one important but general respect
in which the two are identical. Whether the broad sweep of his
tory is viewed in the perspective of class struggle or in that of con
flicting occupational disciplines the character of any particular
epoch will be seen as the expression of the prevailing behavior pat
tern in which the men of that time move, think, and have their so
cial being. This behavior pattern, which includes law, politics,
civil relations, knowledge, and belief, is in turn the product more
or less directly of the existing form of economic organization.
Consequently, any change in the economic or materialistic basis of
society will enforce a corresponding change in the behavior pat
tern, and will thereby bring about a social transformation. But it
is right at this point that an extreme divergence again crops out
between the two theories.
54 Y et “ engrossing” the surplus does serve as the basis of economic class differenti
ation. “ The three conventionally recognised classes, upper, middle, and lower, are
all and several pecuniary categories; the upper being typically that (aristocratic)
class which is possessed of wealth without having worked or bargained for it; while
the middle class have come by their holdings through some form of commercial
(business) traffic; and the lower class gets what it has by workmanship. It is a
gradation of (a) predation, (b) business, (c) industry; the former being disserviceable
and gainful, the second gainful, and the third serviceable.” The Instinct of Workman
ship, p. 184.
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II
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL MUTATIONISM

The manner in which the individual is assumed to respond to
economic stimuli and the way in which the environment, from
which the stimuli arise, itself changes, are different in the two
theories. Because of this the interaction between the behavior
pattern and the material conditions varies according to whether
reasoning proceeds in the dialectics of class struggle or in the logic
of conflicting occupational habituations. When class struggle is
the basis of reasoning, institutional change is deterministic and
teleological. When occupational habituation is the basis of reason
ing, change, although inevitable, is uncertain in character and
proceeds as chance variations. In the former case the theory of
movement is historical materialism, and in the latter, institutional
mutationism.
To bring out the dissimilarity in the assumptions of Marx and
Veblen concerning the interaction between man and material con
ditions and, thereby, the contrasts in their respective theories, we
will begin by noting the relationship between the behavior pattern
and the economic structure as posited by Marx and how changes
in the latter induce changes in the former. According to Marx the
behavior pattern is determined by the social relations that arise
from the conditions of production, distribution, and exchange.
Hence changes in these conditions will produce changes in the so
cial relations and in that way provoke a change in the behavior
pattern.55 Marx asks:
D oes it require deep intuition to comprehend that m an’s ideas, views,
and conceptions, in one word, m an’s consciousness, changes w ith every
change in the conditions of his m aterial existence, in his social relations, and in
his social life? W h at else does the history of ideas p rove than that intellectual
production changes in character in proportion as m aterial production is
changed?56

Inasmuch as Marx makes material changes (changes in the mode
of production, distribution, and exchange) proceed in conformity
ss Critique of Political Economy (Kerr edition, Chicago, 1904), p. n .
56 The Communist Manifesto, p. 51.
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with the dialectics of class struggle, the corresponding changes in
social relations and in the behavior pattern proceed in like fashion.
When, for example, the means of production are the property of a
given class, as in a capitalistic economy, the social relations reflect
the subordination of the non-propertied class by the propertied.
The prevailing behavior pattern is thus the ideological reflection
of the economic prerogatives and political power of the owners of
property.
Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of exist
ence, as foundation, there is built a superstructure of diversified and char
acteristic sentiments, illusions, habits of thought, and outlooks on life in
general. T h e class as a whole creates and shapes them out of its m aterial
foundation, and out of the corresponding social relationships.57

Since according to Marx the prevailing behavior pattern is noth
ing more than the manifestation in the ideal world of the subor
dination of one class by another, it is through the revolutionary
displacement of the existing ruling class by the subordinated that
a transformation is brought about in the behavior pattern. But
before such a transformation is possible it is necessary, (i) that
the material (productive) forces will have reached their full de
velopment in the old society; and (2) that the subordinated class,
conscious of this development, will recognize itself to be the in
strument of economic necessity and will act accordingly:
A n oppressed class is the vita l condition of every society based upon the
antagonism of classes. T h e em ancipation of the oppressed class therefore
necessarily implies the creation of a new society. In order for the oppressed
class to be em ancipated it is necessary that the productive powers already
acquired and the existing social relations should no longer be able to exist
side b y side. Of all the instrum ents of production the greatest productive
power is the revolutionary class itself. T h e organisation of the revolutionary
elements as a class supposes the existence of all the productive forces which
can be engendered in the bosom of the old society.58

How do these changes in productive forces create in the subor
dinated class this awareness of economic necessity and the willing
ness to act in accordance with it? It has been noted that in the
Marxian interpretation changes in the modes of production (the
57 The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, pp. 7-8.
s8 The Poverty of Philosophy (Kerr edition, Chicago, n.d.), pp. 189-90.
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material basis of society) exert themselves upon human behavior,
and consequently upon history, through the differential effect of
economic conditions upon social classes. These conditions, im
posed by changes in the productive forces, take their effect in the
form of income. And it is the exigencies of income which create in
the different classes a consciousness of the difference in their mate
rial circumstances. As a result of the differential hardship experi
enced by the less fortunate class it becomes conscious of the disserviceability of the old economic arrangements. It is likewise
these same conditions that cause the less fortunate class to recog
nize the untenability of the ideological forms of the old society.
Thus the less fortunate class sets out to refashion the economic
structure along lines conformable with its economic interest. In
doing so, it brings about a new set of values, new standards of
judgments, in brief, creates a new behavior pattern.
In the conditions of the proletariat, those of old society at large are al
ready virtu ally swamped. T h e proletarian is w ithout property; his relation
to his wife and children has no longer anything in common w ith the bourgeois
fam ily relations; modern industrial labor, modern subjection to capital, the
same in England as in France, in A m erica as in G erm any, has stripped him
of every trace of national character. Law , m orality, religion, are to him so
m any bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as m any
bourgeois interests...........T h e proletarians cannot become masters of the
productive forces of society except b y abolishing their own previous mode
of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropria
tion. T h e y have nothing of their own to secure and to fo rtify; their mission
is to destroy all previous securities for and insurances of individual p roperty.59

The foregoing analysis leads to the following conclusions. One
of the underlying assumptions in the Marxian theory of change is
that individuals in the final analysis will always choose that line of
action which is in keeping with their material class interests. This
assumption is based upon a tacit belief in the reasoned response of
human beings to economic stimulation. Another assumption is
that changes in the economic environment take place dialectically.
Marx states, for example, in his analysis of capitalism, that “ the
modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of de
velopment, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production
59 The Communist Manifesto, p. 42.
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and of exchange,” 60and he adds that “ the bourgeoisie cannot exist
without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production,
and with them the whole relations of society.”61 It is only with
these assumptions guided by a purposive logic that Marx was able
to predict invariant changes in production which would for cer
tainty give rise to differential class hardship, and that the human
beings affected by these conditions would respond to them in a
manner requisite to the teleological demands of his scheme of
evolution.
Marxian materialism, proclaimed Engels, “ is destined to do for
history what Darwin’s theory has done for biology.” 62 And Marx
himself “ greeted Darwin’s theory of evolution as a ‘support from
natural science.’ ” 63 It is not strange that Marx and Engels, pre
occupied with the arduous labors of propagating heterodox ideas
in a hostile intellectual environment, overlooked the stark differ
ences between their own preconceptions and those of Darwin. Ex
cept for superficial resemblances in terminology, there is hardly
any connection between class conflict and Darwin’s principles of
“ struggle for existence” and “ natural selection.” For when the
dialectics of historical movement is made to proceed in terms of
Darwin’s biological principles it is impossible to predict the char
acter and form of social change. On the basis of Darwinism change
would occur as chance variations, unpredictable phenomena,
highly uncertain in outcome, and tending to no predetermined
goal. Moreover, the effect of Darwin’s theory upon psychology
we now know invalidates M arx’s assumption respecting the re
sponse of the individual to the material or economic environment.
Thus Veblen, who developed his theory of economic evolution
from Darwinian principles, makes the following criticism of the
theory of human behavior on which class struggle is based. He
states:
Under the D arw inian norm it must be held that m en’s reasoning is largely
controlled b y other than logical, intellectual forces; that the conclusion
60Ibid., p. 32.

61 Ibid., p. 34.

62 See Engels’ introduction to the Communist Manifesto.

63 Max Eastman, “ Marx and Lenin,” The Science of Revolution (New York, 1927),
p. 67.
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reached by public or class opinion is as much, or more, a matter of sentiment
than of logical inference; and that the sentiment which animates men, singly
or collectively, is as much, or more, an outcome of habit and native pro
pensity as of calculated material interest. There is, for instance, no warrant
in the Darwinian scheme of things for asserting a priori that the class interest
of the working class will bring them to take a stand against the propertied
class. It may as well be that their training in subservience to their employers
will bring them again to realise the equity and excellence of the established
system of subjection and unequal distribution of wealth..........It is quite
impossible on Darwinian ground to foretell whether the “ proletariat” will
go on to establish the socialistic revolution or turn aside again, and sink their
force in the broad sands of patriotism

.64

It is evident that Veblen’s assumptions concerning the psychol
ogy of human nature are different from M arx’s.65 There is, how
ever, some agreement between them respecting the weight of ma
terial or economic conditions as factors of change. According to
Veblen:
The material conditions of industry, trade and daily life during the period
of transition and approach to this modern ground created that frame of
mind which we call the modern point of view and dictated that reconstruc
tion of institutional arrangements which has been worked out under its
guidance. Therefore the economic situation which so underlay and con
ditioned this modern point of view at the period when it was given its stable
form becomes the necessary point of departure for any argument bearing on
the changes that have been going forward since then, or on any prospective
reconstruction that may be due to follow from these changed conditions in
the calculable future

.66

Like Marx he would also argue that changes in the economic con
ditions carry with them changes in the behavior pattern.
Any large and persistent change in the material conditions— such, e.g., as
has been taking effect in the scale and methods of industry during the past
one hundred years— will necessarily be followed in due course by more or
less pronounced changes in the established order of human relations and
64 The Place of Science, pp. 441-42.
65 The class struggle is worked out by Marx with the aid of implicit rational psy
chological assumptions. Y et his criticism of Bentham’s principle of utility and like
wise of the materialism of Feuerbach are very suggestive of the much later objec
tive types of psychology. See “ Marx on Feuerbach” in Frederick Engels, Feuerbach,
The Roots of Socialist Philosophy (Kerr edition, Chicago, 1903), p. 129. Also Marx,
Capital, I, 668, n. 2; and Eastman, op. cit., pp. 220-22.
66 The Vested Interests, p. 26.
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principles of conduct; but it need not follow that the resulting changes in
law and morals will be of such a nature as to enhance the facility of life under
the new order of m aterial conditions which has induced these changes.6?

But while Veblen accepts material conditions as the driving force
in his scheme of evolution he makes these conditions and likewise
human nature follow Darwinian principles rather than Hegelian
logic. In addition to Darwin’s principles of “ struggle for exist
ence” and “ natural selection,” he also makes use of the Mendelian
law of inheritance, and the mutation theory of deVries. B y con
structing his theory of economic evolution in the framework of
Darwinism, or neo-Darwinism when the theories of deVries and
Mendel are included, Veblen makes institutional change a process
of discontinuous variations in habituation and in material condi
tions.
T h e growth of culture is a cum ulative sequence of habituation, and the
w ays and means of it are habitual response of human nature to exigencies
that v a ry incontinently, cum ulatively, but w ith something of a consistent
sequence in the cum ulative variations that so go forw ard,— incontinently, be
cause each new move creates a new situation which induces a further new
variation in the habitual manner of response; cum ulatively, because each
new situation is a variation of w hat has gone before it and embodies as causal
factors all that has been effected b y w hat went before; consistently, because
the underlying traits of human nature (propensities, aptitudes, and w hat
not) b y force of which the response takes place, and on the ground of which
the habituation takes effect, remain substantially unchanged.68

Even though he accepts material factors as driving forces, he
can make no prediction that they will necessarily bring about a
better scheme of social relations.69 Nor can he predict the form
these changes are destined to take or their effect upon human na
ture. He could not do so and remain consistent with his Dar
winian premises. On the basis of these premises he maintains that
changes in economic conditions come in as innovations, or as the
67 Absentee Ownership, p. 18.

68 The Place of Science, pp. 241-42.

69 This aloof objectivity is not maintained with any great degree of consistency.
For example, in his criticism of the inefficiency of business enterprise, he implies
that capitalism is to be supplanted by a more serviceable and more efficient, there
fore more desirable(?) type of economic organization. See The Theory of Business
Enterprise, especially chaps, viii and ix; and The Engineers and the Price System,
chaps, i, ii, and vi.
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results of borrowings and the diffusion of culture. Maintaining
that economic changes are chance phenomena, that is, that they
proceed mutationally70 rather than dialectically, and that human
nature responds to them in terms of native propensity and habit,
Veblen denies that a revision of the code of conduct follows imme
diately or soon after the impact of economic changes. “ Institu
tions,” he says, “ by no means change with the alacrity which the
sole efficiency of a reasoned class interest would require.” 71 A c
cordingly, in an advanced culture there is always going on a pro
gressive displacement of old institutions, their corresponding hab
its, and systems of knowledge and beliefs by new ones. But new
institutions do not immediately displace old ones. The old institu
tions tend to lag in a more or less decadent state. Consequently
change is the resultant of a drawn-out contest between old and
new institutions, or social habits, as the prevailing way of life in
the community.
T h e situation of today shapes institutions of tomorrow through a selec
tive, coercive process, b y acting upon m en’s habitual view of things, and so
altering or fortifying a point of view or a m ental attitude handed down from
the past. T h e institutions— that is to say the habits of thought— under the
guidance of which men live are in this w ay received from an earlier time;
more or less rem otely earlier, but in any event they have been elaborated in
and received from the past. Institutions are products of the past process, are
adapted to past circumstances, and are therefore never in full accord w ith
the requirements of the present. In the nature of the case, this process of
selective adaptation can never catch up w ith the progressively changing
situation in which the com m unity finds itself at any given tim e; for the en
vironm ent, the situation, the exigencies of life which enforce the adaptation
and exercise the selection, change from day to day; and each successive situa
tion of the com m unity in its turn tends to obsolescence as soon as it has been
established.?2

7° “ The mutation theories,” he stated, “ of course, have immediately to do with
the facts of biological derivation alone, but when the facts are reviewed in the light
of these theories it will be found that questions of cultural origins and relationship
are necessarily drawn into the inquiry.” The Place of Science, p. 458. Accordingly
the appearance of private property making for the “ supercession of free work
manship by a pecuniary control of industry” was the “ most universal and most
radical mutation which human culture has undergone in its advance from savagery
to civilisation.” The Instinct of Workmanship, p. 147.
71 The Place of Science, p. 314.
72 The Theory of the Leisure Class1 pp. 190-91.
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Before inquiring into the interaction between variations in hu
man nature and in material conditions as viewed by Veblen, an
examination should be made of his conception of human nature.
In a previous quotation he stated that human nature “ remains
substantially unchanged.” This seems to conflict with another
statement of his that “ the human material of society itself varies
with changing conditions of life.” 73 The contradiction arises from
the fact that at one time he views human nature as a chang
ing phenomenon, and at another, as a stable one. It is reconciled,
however, in his explanation of the composition of human nature.
Human nature or the “ spiritual nature of man” is made up of a
“ complement of instinctive dispositions” which include “ native
propensity and its appropriate sentiment.” 74 These instinctive
dispositions Veblen enumerates as follows: the sense of workman
ship (instinct of workmanship), the parental bent, the self-regarding feeling, the pugnacious disposition, and instinctive or idle
curiosity.75 Since these native propensities are the “ irreducible
elements of human nature” arising from “ quasi-tropismatic or
physiological nature” 76 they as well as the physiological traits are
inherited.77 But the co-ordination of these inherited traits is dif
ferent as between racial stocks; and the permutation and com
bination of them vary as between individuals of the same racial
stock. We can therefore say that Veblen conceives human nature
to be stable or unchanging because, (i) the nature or purposive
ends of native proclivities do not change; (2) the native traits are
transmitted according to Mendelian inheritance; and, (3) because
each racial type has its own relatively fixed endowment of in
stincts.78 On the other hand, human nature becomes a mutating
73 Ibid., p. 213.
74 The Instinct of Workmanship, p. 14.
7s Ibid., pp. 24, 25, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 86, 89, and 90. Veblen’s criticism of the in
stinct concept should be noted. He says that although instinct is shifty and lacks
precision for exhaustive psychological analysis, it can be used in the analysis of insti
tutions. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
76Ibid., p. 3.
77 Ibid., p. 13.

78
“ It is perhaps as needless to insist on this spiritual difference between the various
racial stocks as it would be difficult to determine the specific differences that are
known to exist, or to exhibit them convincingly in detail. To some such ground
much of the distinctive character of different peoples is no doubt to be assigned,
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or provisionally unstable phenomenon whenever pure racial types
are crossed. A pure racial stock approaches uniformity in both its
physical and its spiritual or instinctive characteristics,79whereas a
hybrid stock shows extreme diversity in these respects.
The countries which best typify hybridization and which, at the
same time, have carried materia] development and individual suc
cess based upon it to their highest pitch are England, United
States, France, Germany, Denmark, and Holland.80 The hybrid
populations of these countries are composed of three ethnic types,
the dolichocephalic-blond, the brachycephalic-brunette, and the
Mediterranean. These three racial types are placed by Veblen
into two categories, the predatory and the ante-predatory, “ the
dolicho-blond type showing more of the characteristics of the
predatory temperament— or at least more of the violent disposi
tion— than the brachycephalic-brunette type, and especially more
than the Mediterranean/’81 Since within each ethnic type there is
a predatory and an ante-predatory variant, it is probable, says
Veblen that “ the effective temperament of modern communities is
not altogether due to a selection between stable ethnic types. It
seems to be to some appreciable extent a selection between the
predatory and the peaceable (ante-predatory) variants of the sev
eral types.”82 This difference in the character of the two variants
is traceable to a difference in range of instincts and their co-ordi
nation. In the ante-predatory variant, the self-regarding and pug
nacious instincts are weak in comparison with the parental bent.
To the parental bent is traceable the “ bias for serviceability and
against waste.” This bias “ falls in directly with the promptings of
the instinct of workmanship, so that these two instinctive predis
positions will re-enforce one another in conducing to an imperson
ally economical use of materials and resources as well as to the
though much also may as well be traceable to local peculiarities of environment and
of institutional circumstances. Something of the kind, a specific difference in the
genius of the people, is by common consent assigned, for instance, in explanation of
the pervasive difference in technology and workmanship between the Western cul
ture and the Far East.” Ibid., p. i n . Also Imperial Germany, p. 2.

79 The Instinct of Workmanship, pp. 14-15.
80Imperial Germany, p. 6. Also Instinct of Workmanship, pp. 15-16.
81 The Theory of the Leisure Class, p. 217.

82Ibid.
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full use of workmanlike capacities, and to an endless taking of
pains.”83 The motives of this type being non-emulative and noninvidious will under the stress of the “ struggle for existence” be
come crystallized into habits connected with the non-competitive
productive (industrial) side of economic activity. On the other
hand, the predatory type is pugnacious and self-regarding. Al
though the sense of workmanship and the parental instinct are
also present in this type they are overridden by the other two.
The habits to whose formation this type of native endowment
conduces are individual thrift, acquisitiveness, and competitive
emulation. In brief, the predatory variant of human nature is
the basis of invidious or self-regarding and pecuniary habits.
These two types of aptitudes or propensities and their correspond
ing sentiments and habits are the spiritual inheritance of the hy
brid peoples of the Western world. Because they are hybrids,
these peoples possess an extreme diversity of temperament and
tend in their breeding to revert to one of the two variants of hu
man nature. This variability has important institutional bear
ings. On the one hand,
. . . . a larger, fuller, more varied and more broadly balanced scheme of
culture will, under tolerable circum stances, be found among such a people
than in a com m unity made up of individuals that breed true w ith a close
approximation to a single specific type.84

but on the other,
. . . . a hybrid population will, of course, also have the faults of its quali
ties. T h e divergence of tem peram ent and proclivities will be as wide as that
of its capacities and aptitudes; and the unrest that works out in a m ultiform
ramification of achievem ents on the one side is likely to w ork out also in a
profuse output of irritation and dissentient opinions, ideals and aspirations
on the other side. For good or ill, such has been the congenital make-up of
the W estern peoples, and such, it m ay be called to mind, has also been the
history of W estern civilisation.8*

Veblen’s conception of human nature as set forth in the preced
ing paragraphs leads him to different conclusions from those of
Marx respecting the interaction of human nature and material
conditions. The conclusions may be summarized in the following
8* The Instinct of Workmanship, p. 60.
84 Imperial Germany, p. 9.

85 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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manner in order to show the contrast they make between his in
stitutional mutationism and M arx’s historical materialism:
Conclusion (1): T h e n ative endowment or peculiar nature of a given
people determines the range and character of their habits thereby constitut
ing the spiritual complex out of which their institutions are developed. B u t
this n ative genius will thus express itself only under appropriate m aterial
and economic conditions; and
Conclusion (2): W here human nature possesses a high degree of variabil
ity resulting from crossing, the institutional scheme is apt to be more varied
and complex because the response to changing economic circum stance is
more ready than where the racial stock breeds true to a given type. T h ere
fore under the pressure of economic vicissitudes, a population that is rela
tive ly unstable m ay give rise to one or several divergent institutional
growths. T hese divergent institutional growths m ay in time become ac
commodated to each other or one of them m ay succeed in displacing or sub
ordinating the others.

From the first conclusion it follows that the development of
such habits, and therefore institutions, as a given native psycho
logical equipment will afford, will appear only under the stress of
economic or material circumstances. The process whereby these
traits are crystallized into habits is one of Darwinian selection. In
the “ struggle for existence” the individuals possessing the neces
sary traits for survival in the given physical and economic en
vironment will survive but those devoid of these traits will be
weeded out. Thus the ethnic types out of which the hybrid peo
ples of Western civilization arose survived because they were
adaptable to the physical and economic environment in which
they found themselves. The emergence of these mutant types
Veblen attributes to some physiological strain induced in the
parent stock by changes in its physical environment and indus
trial organization.86 These two sets of material conditions, espe
cially those in the industrial arts, exercised both a selective and dis
ciplinary influence upon the types falling within their scope. How
the industrial changes came to exercise this influence Veblen dem
onstrates in his account of the emergence of the blond mutant.
The economic organisation which existed about the time the
blond type emerged is described by him as the “ savage state of the
86 The Place of Science, p. 477.
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industrial arts,” a technology of primitive husbandry of domesti
cated animals and crop plants but one in which the mechanic arts
were only moderately advanced. It was a peaceful (ante-preda
tory) culture dominated by considerations of collective welfare.
As the blond was essentially more ferocious than either of the two
other types that had become adapted to the primitive technology
it would be expected that he would be something of a “ disturber
of the peace.” Something of the kind did occur as is revealed in
the sagas of the North Sea peoples.87 Although prone to piracy
and marauding88 the blond stock never established a full blown
“ predatory” culture such as was developed by the “ Semitic in
vaders in the East” ;89first, because it was a more or less peaceable
variant of the predatory type of human nature; and, second, be
cause predaceous propensities are best crystallized into habits
under a pastoral (patriarchal) technology. The peculiar topogra
phy of Europe, “ small-scale and broken” would not admit of this
type of economic organization.90 Consequently the predatory dis
positions of the blond took the form of “ fraud” and “ emulous rival
ry.” These traits found their natural expression in habits of acqui
sition and ownership, the psychological basis of the pecuniary cul
ture. With the appearance therefore of the dolicho-blond the “ sav
age state of industrial arts” was subjected to a pecuniary control
the social implications of which were outlined in an earlier part of
this essay. But the blond, being of a mechanical turn of mind,
would find the mechanic arts as much of an outlet for his instinctive
endowment as the institution of ownership. As a result, not only
was the primitive technology subordinated to a pecuniary control
with the appearance of the blond, but its mechanical character was
elaborated and extended. But once the institution of ownership
was established, causing industry to undergo pecuniary control and
guidance, the economic basis was laid for a whole series of non
industrial or leisure-class occupations. These occupations tended
to perpetuate predatory habits, the individuals highly endowed
with the corresponding invidious or self-regarding traits being se87 See Veblen, Laxdoela Saga (New York, 1925).
88 The Place of Science, pp. 498-99.
89 The Instinct of Workmanship, p. 202.

90Ibid., p. 213.
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lected for employment in them. On the contrary, the industrial
occupations furthered ante-predatory habits tending therefore to
attract those individuals characterized by the corresponding in
stinctive endowment. In this way these two strains of human na
ture, the ante-predatory and the quasi-predatory, were selected
and perpetuated in the biological and psychological inheritance of
the hybrid peoples of Western civilization. Since the two modes of
economic activity, the pecuniary and the industrial, whereby
these racial stocks and their natural endowment were perpetu
ated, still exist in the economic life of these modern peoples, Veblen would argue that their ancient selective and disciplinary effect
is the same as it was in the distant past. The result of this is that
in the modern community human nature has been preserved along
one of the two lines of racial inheritance.91
From our second conclusion summarized above it appears that
the variability of human nature gives rise to a complex institu
tional structure in which mutations may at any time be large and
ultimately disruptive of the established order. The institutional
implications of variability are best shown in the response of Veblen’s two variants of human nature to modern economic circum
stances. We have observed that the crossing of the dolicho-blond
stock with the Mediterranean and the brachycephalic-brunette re
sulted in toning down an otherwise ruthless predaceousness. This
cross-breeding gave rise to the two variants of human nature, the
ante-predatory or non-invidious, and the quasi-predatory or in
vidious, to either of which the Western peoples may revert in their
breeding. Under modern economic arrangements class distinc
tions are fashioned in terms of the spiritual make-up of the two
variants. This comes about through the selective discipline of the
pecuniary and the industrial occupations. Those individuals who
are drawn into the pecuniary or non-industrial employments, usu
ally of a predatory temperament, constitute a leisure “ non-pro
ductive” class. Those who are attracted to the industrial or me
chanical occupations, mainly of non-invidious predilections, are
the “ productive” working class. In keeping with this division of
classes Veblen would attribute the radicalism of the industrial
91 The Theory of the Leisure Class, p. 240.
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classes and the conservatism of the leisure class to the discipline
exercised by his two modes of vocational activity upon the two
different categories of racial endowment.92
This differentiation of classes in terms of native endowment is
not as definitive as it first appears in the perspective of occupa
tional discipline. In the first place, the “ selective elimination of
pecuniary traits is an uncertain process.” Thus the predatory
animus may crop out even among the industrial classes.93 In the
second place, there is to be found among the industrial classes
acquired habits that are decidedly invidious or self-regarding.94
The outcropping of inherited invidious traits among the industrial
or working classes Veblen accounts for by the high degree of vari
ability in the racial stock. But the persistence of acquired invidi
ous traits in the lower social stratum he attributes to the impor
tant fact that the social ethic is so dominated by the moral code of
the pecuniary classes that few individuals whatever their voca
tional activity escape its influence.95 Finally, another reason why
the differentiation of social classes according to native endowment
is not definitive is the possibility of reversions to the ante-preda
tory type of human nature among the pecuniary or leisure class.
The employments of the leisure classes in modern industry are such as to
keep alive certain of the predatory habits and aptitudes.......... But there is
something to be said on the other side. Individuals so placed as to be exempt
from strain may survive and transmit their characteristics even if they differ
widely from the average of the species both in physique and in spiritual
make-up. The chances for a survival and transmission of atavistic traits are
greatest in those classes that are most sheltered from the stress of circum
stances. The leisure class is in some degree sheltered from the stress of the
industrial situation, and should, therefore, afford an exceptionally great
proportion of reversions to the peaceable or savage temperament. It should
be possible for such aberrant or atavistic individuals to unfold their life
activity on ante-predatory lines without suffering as prompt a repression or
elimination as in the lower walks of life

.96

Although leisure-class and industrial traits overlap in their insti
tutional manifestations, Veblen insists that there is on the average
92 The Theory of Business Enterprise, p. 354, n. 1.
93 The Theory of the Leisure Class, p. 242.
94Ibid.} p. 242.

95 Ibid., p. 242.

96Ibid., pp. 233-34.
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a generic difference between the two underlying types of human
nature and, therefore, a corresponding difference in the reaction of
his two occupational classes to industrial conditions. According to
him the aforementioned reversions that take place among the
leisure class never attain the magnitude and violent intensity such
as would bring on the destruction of the pecuniary scheme and the
code of values based upon it. The atavistic leisure-class variant is
satisfied with the outlet afforded him in those non-invidious pur
suits which are ameliorative rather than revolutionary. On the
other hand, barring chance variations of a predatory nature, the
invidious habits copied from the leisure class by the industrial are
hardly strong enough to stifle the revolutionary frame of mind
which naturally crops out among the latter under sufficiently
provocative economic circumstances.
Now if there is always a possibility of human nature reverting
to one of two types of psychological endowment, as Veblen main
tains, it is impossible to know as Marx did that human nature will
always respond to given economic changes in a predetermined
way. In view of this it is impossible to know the goal of economic
evolution. Such foreknowledge is all the more precarious if there
is, as Veblen maintains, an interplay of different traits of endow
ment within the industrial and leisure classes; for one cannot be
certain as Marx was that the former class will everywhere come to
take a stand of revolutionary solidarity against the latter and its
social prerogatives. Moreover, if, as Veblen contends, habituation
takes effect only in terms of native endowment, the latter sets the
limits of tolerance within which any given range of economic or
material changes can be effective; therefore, the success of a revo
lutionary reorganization of society depends to a large degree upon
the racial endowment of the social group undertaking it. To use
his words:
. . . . all the while the changeless native proclivities of the race will assert
them selves in some measure in an y eventual revision of the received in stitu
tional system ; and alw ays th ey w ill stand ready eventually to break the
ordered scheme of things into a paralytic mass of confusion if it can not be
bent into some possible degree of congruity w ith the param ount n ative needs
of life.97
97 The Vested Interest, p. n .
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The differences which we have sought to establish between Veblen’s institutional mutationism and M arx’s historical materialism
— differences in the inner mechanism of the two theories growing
out of opposite assumptions concerning human nature and its
interaction with material conditions— all grow out of one impor
tant fundamental. This is that the two explanations of economic
evolution are constructed on the basis of different postulates, a
consideration of which will conclude our analysis.
I ll
THE DARWINIAN AND HEGELIAN POSTULATES

B y reasoning from Darwinian postulates Veblen sees economic
evolution as a “ non-teleological” process in which the “ fittest” in
stitutions or “ habits of thought” survive through “ natural selec
tion.” It is a matter of variation in which the selective power of
any institution or set of institutions derives from the successive
elimination of those variations (institutional growths) that are
harmful in the “ struggle for existence.” 98
“ Struggle for existence” is used by Veblen in a cultural or moral
sense, not in a biological one.99 Had he used it in the latter sense?
to be consistent, he would have had to view economic evolution as
the result of competition for subsistence in the perpetuation of
life as a physiological process. This would have led him to base
the “ survival” value of institutions upon their efficiency in ful
filling physical or natural needs. Such an explanation is admittedly
crude and naive. For life as we know it is a “ struggle for exist
ence” only in a highly artificial sense. The strivings which make
up by far the larger part of life are not biological or physiological
but cultural and aesthetic. This Veblen recognized and, there
fore, limited the application of “ struggle for existence” in the bio
logical sense to the lower forms of culture, and even there with
considerable modification.100 When he comes to a consideration of
institutional change and growth on the higher cultural levels?
where advanced technology and accumulated wealth have de
veloped, his Darwinian postulates serve him merely for the pur98 The Theory of the Leisure Class, p. 188.
99Ibid., pp. 24-25.

100Ibid., p. 26. Also pp. 28-29.
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pose of analogous reasoning. Thus in modern industrial society
“ struggle for existence” is mainly a struggle for “ economic re
spectability.”
If, as is sometimes assumed, the incentive to accum ulation were the w ant
of subsistence or of physical com fort, then the aggregate economic wants of
a com m unity m ight conceivably be satisfied at some point in the advance of
industrial efficiency; but since the struggle is substantially a race for rep
u ta b ility on the basis of an invidious comparison, no approach to a defini
tive attainm ent is possible.101 . . . . Under modern conditions the struggle for
existence has, in a v e ry appreciable degree, been transform ed into a struggle
to keep up appearances.102

And as a struggle for “ economic respectability” the modern
“ struggle for existence” is only remotely related to material or
physical well-being. It revolves about certain intangible values to
which individuals become accustomed as their “ standard of liv
ing.”
A fter m aking proper allowance for individual exceptions and for the ac
tion of prudential restraints, it m ay be said, in a general w ay, that this
em ulation in expenditure stands ever ready to absorb any margin of income
that remains after the ordinary physical wants and comforts have been pro
vided for, and, further, that it presently becomes as hard to give up that
part of one’s habitual “ standard of livin g” which is due to the struggle for
respectability, as it is to give up m any physical com forts...........I t comes
about through the w orking of this principle [emulation] that even the crea
ture comforts, which are in them selves desirable, and it m ay even be, requi
site to life on a passably satisfactory plane, acquire a value as a means of
respectability quite independent of, and out of proportion to, their simple
u tility as a means of livelihood.103

Under Veblen’s Darwinian postulates, then, the “ survival”
value of given economic arrangements depends upon their effi
ciency in enabling various members of the group to maintain or to
expand their standard of living.104 The concrete measure of this
efficiency is found in the relation of cost to serviceability.
In any evolutionary system of economics the central question touching
the efficiency and fitness of any given system of production is necessarily
the question as to the excess of serviceability in the product over cost of pro101 Ibid., p. 32.

102 The Place of Science, p. 399.

103 Ibid., pp. 394-95. (Italics mine.) Also The Theory of the Leisure Class, p. 195.

104 The Theory of the Leisure Class, p. 194.
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duction. I t is in such an excess of serviceability over cost that the chance of
survival lies for any system of production, in so far as the question of sur
v iv a l is a question of production, and this m atter comes into the speculation
of M arx only indirectly or incidentally, and leads to nothing in his argu
m ent.105

Since, however, the consumptive habits to which individuals have
become habituated are the standard by which they measure their
“ fulness of life,” institutional change, as a conscious process, is
brought about by those individuals whose “ fulness of life” is
jeopardized by changing economic conditions.
A n y one who is required to change his habits of life and his habitual rela
tions to his fellow-men will feel the discrepancy between the method of life
required of him b y the new ly arisen exigencies, and the traditional scheme of
life to which he is accustomed. I t is the individuals placed in this position
who have the liveliest incentive to reconstruct the received scheme of life
and are m ost readily persuaded to accept new standards; and it is through
the need of the means of livelihood that men are placed in such a position.106

Although “ fulness of life,” which Veblen thus makes the con
scious end of human beings in the “ struggle for existence,” never
appears as an explicit feature of M arx’s class struggle, it does
seem to underlie the class struggle, implicitly.107 But since, as
we shall show, the class struggle is patterned after the dialectics
of Hegel and accordingly possesses Hegelian characteristics, “ ful
ness of life” so far as it comes into the Marxian theory of evolu
tion is a highly metaphysical conception.
In the Hegelian system proper “ the struggle which constitutes
the method of movement or evolution is . . . . the struggle of
the spirit for self-realisation by the process of the well-known
three-phase dialectic.” 108 The Marxian movement like the Hege
lian is the unfolding of an inner necessity. Whereas Reality in the
Hegelian scheme is Spirit (Idea), in the Marxian it is the sub
limated material life of man, or labor in the abstract. Labor as
metaphysical substance is the Marxian absolute in terms of which
meaning or value is ascribed to economic arrangements. It is im105 The Place of Science, p. 444.

106 The Theory of the Leisure Class, p. 195*

107 See, for example, Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels (edited by Franz Mehring, Berlin, 1923), II, 132.
108 The Place of Science, pp. 414-15.
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measurable and without value, since “ there exists no such thing
as the value of labor in the common acceptance of the word.”
Labour is the substance, and the immanent measure of value, but has
itself no value...........In the expression “ value of labour,” the idea of value
is not only com pletely obliterated, but actu ally reversed. It is an expression
as im aginary as the value of the earth.109

As a value-creating substance which is itself without value, labor
is abstract homogeneous productive activity110of man, or his cre
ative effort which is unfolded as he opposes himself to nature.111
In other words “ labor” is a process the genetic unfolding of which
is expressed in the material products whereby life is sustained.
These products are means of production, on the one hand, and
means of subsistence on the other. Both the means of production
and the means of subsistence are but the phenomenal expressions
of labor, varying with each historical epoch while labor is itself
constant. Labor “ is a necessary condition,” says Marx, “ inde
pendent of all forms of society, for the existence of the human
race; it is an eternal, nature-imposed necessity, without which
there can be no material exchanges between man and Nature, and
therefore no life.” 112 Although the class struggle does revolve
around the material means of life (means of production and means
of subsistence), the latter cannot be said to determine class strug
gle in any absolute sense. They are the phenomenal forms taken
by abstract and non-valuable labor. In the absolute sense class
struggle should be understood as the struggle of labor, the “ prin
ciple of life,” for self-realization. In seeking, therefore, to possess
the means of production, the proletariat as the expression of labor
in the real world is moved not so much by the desire to enhance its
109 Capital, I, 588.
110 “ Productive activity/’ Marx explains, “ if we leave out of sight its special
form, viz., the useful character of the labour, is nothing but the expenditure of human
labour-power. Tailoring and weaving, though qualitatively different productive
activities, are each a productive expenditure of human brains, nerves, and muscles,
and in this sense are human labour. They are but two different modes of expending
human labour-power. Of course, this labour-power, which remains the same under all
its modifications, must have attained a certain pitch of development before it can be ex
pended in a multiplicity of modes.” Ibid., p. 51. (Italics mine.)
111 Ibid., p. 197.

112

Ibid., p. 50.
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material welfare as to establish the moral and political authority
of labor. The proletariat comes to see the class struggle as a con
test for social power and political supremacy.113
This interpretation of class struggle runs counter to the ortho
dox conception of it. According to the latter, used as a matter of
fact by Veblen in one of his criticisms of Marx, the proletariat
seeks to gain possession of the means of production merely to af
fect the distribution of income. Inasmuch as income is under
stood in terms of the valuation of goods as units of subsistence,
class struggle is resolved into a struggle for the physical needs of
life. It would be foolish of us to attempt to deny the emphasis
which Marx placed upon the “ physical exploitation” of labor in
his “ theory of increasing misery.” But we think it can be shown
that M arx’s main purpose in developing this theory was not to re
veal the increasing material discomfort of labor in a capitalist
economy, but its declining “ social satisfactions” and its moral and
political subordination.
In his theory of wages, Marx bases the proletariat’s income on
the “ cost of the laborer’s subsistence and propagation.” 114 The
critics of M arx’s theory of increasing misery have usually over
looked the fact that his subsistence wages have two levels. One of
these levels is “ physical” and the other is “ moral” or “ historical.”
Marx states:
I f the owner of labour-power works to-day, to-morrow he must again be
able to repeat the same process in the same conditions as regards health and
strength. His means of subsistence must therefore be sufficient to m aintain
him in his normal state as a labouring individual. His natural w ants, such
as food, clothing, fuel, and housing, v a ry according to the clim atic and other
physical conditions of his country. On the other hand, the number and
113
The class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the feudal lords was as much a
struggle for “ social power and prerogatives” as for economic (material) dominance.
“ The industrial capitalists,” says Marx, “ these new potentates, had on their part
not only to displace the guild masters of handicrafts, but also the feudal lords, the
possessors of the sources of wealth. In this respect their conquest of social power
appears as the fruit of a victorious struggle both against feudal lordship and its revolting
prerogatives, and against the guilds and the fetters they laid on the free development
of production and the free exploitation of man by man.” Ibid., pp. 786-87. (Italics
mine.)

“ 4 Marx, “ Wage-Labor and Capital,” in Lee, op. cit.f p. 92.
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extent of his so-called necessary w ants, as also the modes of satisfying them,
are them selves the product of historical developm ent, and depend therefore
to a great extent on the degree of civilisation of a country, more particularly
on the conditions under which, and consequently on the habits and the de
gree of com fort in wdiich, the class of free labourers has been formed. In
contradistinction therefore to the case of other commodities, there enters into
the determ ination of the value of labour-power a historical and moral ele
m ent.115

While according to Marx the natural tendency of capitalism is to
drive wages to the level of “ physical” subsistence, the aim of the
workers, organized in political parties and trade unions, is to resist
this downward trend and to achieve the cultural and social ad
vantages that come with higher wages. The extent to which the
workers’ pressure for higher wages can be realized is seriously
limited under capitalism, Marx contends. These limitations re
veal to the proletariat capitalism’s inability fully to satisfy the
higher wants of the laboring masses and confirm its belief in the
practical necessity of revolution.
But if, as Marx seems to admit, the proletariat can obtain
something more than physical subsistence under capitalism how
can he deny the possibility of the proletariat improving its mate
rial position under capitalism? He does not deny this possibility.
For example, he admits that money wages, or the more important
real wages might rise, thereby bettering the proletariat’s physical
well-being. Y e t he does insist that the relative wages must in
evitably decline, or at any rate, relative wages can only increase
at the expense of profits. Marx explains this depreciation and ap
preciation of wages on the three following levels:
(1) T h e real wage expresses the price of labor in relation to the price of
other commodities; the relative wage, on the contrary, expresses the pro
portionate share which living labor gets of the new values created by it as com
pared to that which is appropriated by stored-up labor or capital.II6
(2) . . . . R eal wages m ay remain the same, or they m ay even rise, and
y e t relative wages m ay none the less have fallen.“ 7
(3) R elative wages m ay decline, although the real w ages rise together
w ith nominal wages, or the m oney price of labor; if only it does not rise in
the same proportion as profit. F or instance, if when trade is good, wages
115 Capital, I, 190. Also “ Value, Price, and Profit,” in Lee, op. cit.y p. 164.
116 Lee, op. cit.y p. 100.

117 Ibid., p. 101.
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rise five per cent., and profits on the other hand thirty per cent., then the
proportional or relative wage has not increased but declined

.118

We are not concerned here with the statistical accuracy of
M arx’s theory of distribution but rather with the bearing of this
theory upon the conception of wants underlying his theories of
increasing misery and class struggle. In brief we are not inter
ested in whether history has confirmed M arx’s prediction of an
inevitable decline in the relative wages of the proletariat. What
concerns us is whether he saw in this decline something besides the
progressive worsening of proletarian physical well-being. This
relative decline, it should be observed, is recognized by Marx as a
cultural or social implication of a capitalistic economy.
A notable advance in the amount paid as wages presupposes a rapid in
crease of productive capital. The rapid increase of productive capital calls
forth just as rapid an increase in wealth, luxury, social wants, and social com
forts. Therefore, although the comforts of the laborer have risen, the social
satisfaction which they give has fallen in comparison with these augmented
comforts of the capitalist, which are unattainable for the laborer, and in
comparison with the scale of general development society has reached. Our
wants and their satisfaction have their origin in society; we therefore measure
them in their relation to society, and not in relation to the objects which
satisfy them. Since their nature is social, it is therefore relative

.119

If, as Marx contends, the decline in relative wages gauges the
growing disparity between the “ social satisfaction” of the prole
tariat as over against that of the capitalists, relative wages must
be taken to measure something other than the progressive physi
cal misery of the proletariat. In consequence class struggle is to be
approached from a different standpoint from that of physical or
material necessities. This different standpoint, we repeat, is the
moral or ethical significance of labor to be further observed in
M arx’s consideration of nominal and real wages.
He maintains that while nominal or money wages may increase
with a corresponding improvement in the proletariat’s material
circumstances, they can do so only on one condition, the rapid
accumulation of capital. He states:
When capital is increasing fast, wages may rise, but the profit of capital will
rise much faster. The material position of the laborer has improved, but it is
118 Ibid., p. 103.

119 Ibid., p. 98.
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at the expense of his social position. T h e social gulf which separates him from
the capitalist has widened. F inally, the meaning of the most favorable condi
tion of wage-labor— that is, the quickest possible increase of productive capital
— is m erely th is : T h e faster the w orking classes enlarge and extend the hostile
power that dominates over them, the better will be the conditions under
which they w ill be allow ed to labor for the further increase of bourgeois
w ealth and for the w ider extension of the power of capital, and thus con
ten tedly to forge for them selves the golden chains b y which the bourgeoisie
drags them in its train.120

In other words, an increasing accumulation of capital, although
inevitably accompanied by a decline in relative wages, does not
necessarily produce a corresponding decline in money or real
wages. Thus, while the increasing accumulation of capital cannot
be said to condemn the proletariat to abject physical misery, it
does enforce a bondage which is just as degrading as poverty.
Capital originates in the “ labour process” only as means of pro
duction and subsistence, but under the institution of private
property it becomes the means of divorcing labor from its prod
ucts and expropriating it from the means of production. The pro
gressive accumulation of capital and its concentration in private
hands therefore increases the dependence of the proletariat upon
ownership; s u b o r d i n a t e s I f bor^to its own products; and increases
the “ power of stored-up labor over living labor.” 121 This subor
dination of labor in material production is reflected ideologically,
that is, reflected in the realm of politics, law, morals, and ethics.
For since it is the ownership of the products of labor that deter
mines political power and social esteem, the accumulation of cap
ital deprives labor of social power and degrades it in the eyes of
those who perform it, as well as in the eyes of those who buy it.
Whatever the material comforts of the proletariat may be in a
capitalist economy, the subordination of labor to the moral and
political prerogatives of ownership increases with the accumula
tion of capita], which means the “ increase of dominion of the
bourgeoisie over the laboring class.” 122
. . . . W ithin the capitalist system all methods for raising the social pro
ductiveness of labour are brought about at the cost of the individual la120Ibid., pp. 103-4.

121 Ibid., p. 97.

122 Ibid.
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bourer; all means for the developm ent of production transform them selves
into means of domination over, and exploitation of, the producers; they m uti
late the labourer into a fragm ent of a man, degrade him to the level of an
appendage of a machine, destroy every remnant of charm in his w ork and
turn it into a hated toil; they estrange from him the intellectual p otentiali
ties of the labour-process in the same proportion as science is incorporated
in it as an independent power; th ey distort the conditions under w hich he
works, subject him during the labour-process to a despotism the more hate
ful for its meanness...........It follows therefore that in proportion as capital
accumulates, the lot of the labourer, be his paym ent high or low, m ust grow
w orse.123

The conclusion seems inescapable that the progressive degrada
tion of proletarian status upon which Marx persistently focuses
attention is nothing less than the “ subordination of labor to the
capitalist mode of production.” 124 And since the “ life-process of
society” is maintained only through the expenditure of labor, the
subordination of labor to the process of production is the degra
dation of life itself. Hence, in final analysis, class struggle is the
attempt of labor to emancipate itself from moral and political sub
jection which the private ownership of its products makes possible
thereby exalting itself to a position of social power consonant with
its historical and metaphysical function.
This finally brings us to the relationship between “ class strug
gle” and “ struggle for existence.” Underlying each of these con
cepts is the idea that the “ survival” value of economic arrange
ments resides in their efficiency in preserving the life of various
members of the group. Life is not understood in either instance
merely in the sense of a biological or physiological datum, al
though Marx develops it metaphysically and Veblen attempts to
explain it empirically. As has been previously stated, Marx, in
reasoning from Hegelian premises, made the class struggle revolve
about abstract labor or the material life of man as the absolute
123 Capital, I, 708-9.
124 ‘‘Fanatically bent on making value expand itself, he (the capitalist) ruthlessly
forces the human race to produce for production’s sake; he thus forces the develop
ment of the productive powers of society, and creates those material conditions?
which alone can form the real basis of a higher form of society, a society in which
the full and free development of every individual forms the ruling principle.” Ibid.,
p. 649. (Italics mine.)
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which the historical process tends to realize. Metaphysically, la
bor is co-equal with life.125 In this Marxian scheme of evolution,
“ fulness of life” will be achieved when labor is no longer “ a means
of life,” whose utility is measured by its cost of production (sub
sistence wages), but is taken to be what it is, the co-equal of life.
This co-equality the historical process seeks to realize. The meth
od of realization is the dialectics of class struggle. The consumma
tion is communism. But Veblen finds, on the basis of Darwinian
postulates, that the “ life” of man in society unfolds itself largely
as “ habit.” For him there can therefore be no invariant or abso
lute principle on which “ fulness of life” can be decided prior to
experience. “ Fulness of life” is simply what men are constrained
by “ habit” to believe life ought to he. And what life ought to he is
decided by the consumptive habits or the accustomed standard of
living of various members of the group. Although Veblen adopts
no absolute standard of “ fulness of life,” the concept involves him
in a glaring inconsistency which is not found in Marx whatever
other illogicalities the latter may be accused of.
To base “ fulness of life” upon standard of living as Veblen does
is after all to base it upon “ income,” whether we measure income
in physical or value units. But if, as we noted above, the con
scious end of human beings in the “ struggle for existence” is “ ful
ness of life,” and if “ fulness of life” is estimated by income, as it
must to make economic sense, Veblen’s “ struggle for existence”
stripped of verbiage is nothing more than a struggle for income.
Now if the “ struggle for existence” is a struggle for income, the
driving force in Veblen’s theory of change must be the distribution
of income rather than occupational disciplines. This contradic
tion is best seen in his ideas on the decline of capitalism.
He attributed this decline to the conflicting occupational habits
of the technicians, engineers, and industrial workers, on the one
side, and the business, financial, or non-industrial classes on the
other. Habituated to workmanship, the technical classes become
impatient of the “ systematic retardation and derangement of proI2s “ Man himself, viewed as the impersonation of labour-power, is a natural
object, a thing, although a living conscious thing, and labour is the manifestation
of this power residing in him.” Ibid., p. 225.
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ductive industry’7 by business men whose paramount concern in
production is private profit. Now if the technical classes come to
dispossess the business classes of their control and ownership of
industry as Veblen predicts and hopes, it seems that they will do
so because the inefficiency of the industrial system under business
management is revolting to their habits of technological efficiency.
But surely Veblen does not think that industry is to be thus taken
over merely for the sake of permitting engineers to give free rein
to their efficiency. Even if the desire for efficiency per se were the
motive whereby the technical class will be brought to act against
the business interests, it is utterly impossible to conceive of any
revolutionary frame of mind being kindled among the populace,
without whose aid such a change would be improbable, with the
shibboleth of industrial efficiency. If we can rely upon the history
of revolutions for guidance respecting the motives to change,126 it
seems that it is only when the populace envisages inefficiency as
impaired income or standard of living that they can be counted on
to furnish the mass power necessary to any revolution. And it is
to the distribution of income, not occupational discipline of the
technical classes, that Veblen finally resorts for his incentives to
change. Thus he states:
Under these circumstances it seems reasonable to expect that the syste
m atic retardation and derangement of productive industry which is entailed
b y the current business-like m anagem ent w ill w ork out in a progressive
abatem ent of the margin of net output of the industrial system at large; that
this progressive abatem ent of the net industrial output will presently reach
and pass the critical point of no net return— as counted in physical units of
livelihood; and that in the calculable future the industrial system , so m an
aged on sound business principles, w ill run on lines of a progressively
“ diminishing return,” converging to an eventual lim it of tolerance in the
w ay of a reduced subsistence m inim um ...........I2?

The mass discontent which is likely to result from this “ techno
logical deficit” he portrays as follows:
In the long run, so soon as the privation and chronic derangement which
follows from this application of business principles has grown unduly irk
some and becomes intolerable, there is due to come a sentim ental revulsion
126 See Lyford P. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution (Chicago, 1927).
127 Absentee Ownership, pp. 421-22.
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and a m uttering protest that “ something w ill have to be done about it,” as,
e.g., in the case which has arisen in the coal industry.128 . . . . T h ere is al
w ays the chance, more or less imminent, th at in tim e, after due trial and
error, on duly prolonged and intensified irritation, some sizable element of
the underlying population, not intrinsically com m itted to absentee owner
ship, will forsake or forget their moral principles of business-as-usual, and
will thereupon endeavor to take this businesslike arrangem ent to pieces and
put the works together again on some other plan, for better or worse.129

In final analysis, then, it is not conflicting habits arising from
different occupational disciplines but income which furnishes the
motive to change in Veblen’s theory of economic evolution. For
while his “ technological deficit” is accounted in physical rather
than value units, it affects the economic satisfactions of the under
lying population in much the same way that “ increasing misery”
does the proletariat in the Marxian scheme. From this it seems
legitimate to observe that, despite his adoption of scientific postu
lates, Veblen is no more successful than Marx in formulating a
scientific and objective explanation of history— assuming, of
course, that such an explanation is possible. Like Marx he sought
to develop certain standards for evaluating economic practices
under current institutions. Unlike Marx his social judgments lack
the political passion which impels men upon the adoption of them
to seek their realization through concerted action against the
established order.
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128 Ibid., p . 424 ,
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